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I. Introduction 
International trade in archaeological artifacts has become 
increasingly fraught, as armed conflict and political instability have 
spread since 2003 throughout the archaeologically rich regions of 
the Middle East and North Africa, accompanied by destruction of 
historic and religious structures, looting of archaeological sites, and 
thefts from cultural and religious repositories.1  As a result, the 
 
† Patty Gerstenblith is a Distinguished Research Professor at DePaul University College 
of Law. 
 1 Fiona Greenland et al., We’re Just Beginning to Grasp the Toll of the Islamic 
State’s Archaeological Looting in Syria, THE RAND BLOG (May 15, 2019), 
https://www.rand.org/blog/2019/05/were-just-beginning-to-grasp-the-toll-of-the-
islamic.html [https://perma.cc/7TEG-HAEQ]; Megan Gannon, “Space Archaeologists” 
Show Spike in Looting at Egypt’s Ancient Sites, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Feb. 29, 2016), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/space-archaeologists-show-spike-in-looting-
at-egypt-s-ancient-sites/ [https://perma.cc/2CMV-3CFA]; Brigit Katz, New Online 
Database Catalogues 20,000 Threatened Archeological Sites, SMITHSONIAN (June 1, 
2017), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/new-online-database-catalogues-
20000-threatened-archaeological-sites-180963451/ [https://perma.cc/4GBK-6FV9]. 
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intersection of the antiquities trade with international law and the 
domestic law of individual market states has expanded 
significantly.2  The trade in undocumented or poorly documented 
antiquities incentivizes looting3 of archaeological sites to supply the 
market,4 resulting in detrimental effects and negative consequences 
for our ability to reconstruct and understand the past.5  The artifact 
is decontextualized and what it can tell us about the past is limited 
to the information intrinsic within the object itself, rather than what 
might have been learned from the object’s full associated context.6  
Because of the negative externalities imposed on society through 
the looting of archaeological sites, a body of international and 
domestic law has developed to reduce the economic incentive to 
loot archaeological sites and to trade in such artifacts.7  Because 
 
 2 See Patty Gerstenblith, Controlling the International Market in Antiquities: 
Reducing the Harm, Preserving the Past, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 169, 174–77 (2007) (discussing 
the progression of international law in an attempt to stem the sale and trafficking of looted 
archaeological artifacts). 
 3 A looted antiquity is one recovered from the ground in an unscientific manner and 
may be characterized as illegal depending on applicable legal provisions. Siobhan M. Hart 
& Elizabeth S. Chilton, Digging and Destruction: Artifact Collecting as Meaningful Social 
Practice, 21 INT’L J. HERITAGE STUD. 1, 2 (2014) (“[Looting is] the act of digging up 
artifacts for private collection or sale without the concomitant record of excavation, 
context and lab work associated with scientific archaeology.”). 
 4 See Morag M. Kersel, From the Ground to the Buyer: A Market Analysis of the 
Trade in Illegal Antiquities, in ARCHAEOLOGY, CULTURAL HERITAGE, & THE ANTIQUITIES 
TRADE 188, 188 (Neil Brodie et al. eds., 2006) (describing the role of the international art 
market and the demand for artifacts from Western collectors in incentivizing the looting 
of sites). 
 5 See Gerstenblith, supra note 2, at 170–74 (discussing information lost through 
looting of archaeological sites); see also Laetitia La Follette, The Trial of Marion True and 
Changing Policies for Classical Antiquities in American Museums, in NEGOTIATING 
CULTURE: HERITAGE, OWNERSHIP, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 38, 42–44, 51–54 
(Laetitia La Follette ed., 2013) [hereinafter La Follette, The Trial of Marion True] 
(discussing the information lost through looting of the Euphronios krater and what is 
learned from scientifically excavated objects). 
 6 See Gerstenblith, supra note 2, at 172; see also Alex W. Barker, Provenience, 
Provenance and Context(s), in THE FUTURES OF OUR PASTS: ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF 
COLLECTING ANTIQUITIES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 19, 20 (Michael A. Adler & 
Susan Benton Bruning eds., 2012) (“[C]ontext . . . refers to the association of an object 
that allows its importance or significance to be assessed.”). 
 7 See Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, 
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property arts. 2–3, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 
U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter 1970 UNESCO Convention] (recognizing the harms of selling 
looted artifacts and declaring that it shall be illegal to do so); Convention on Cultural 
Property Implementation Act (CPIA), 19 U.S.C. §§ 2602–2603 (2018) (providing a 
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such objects are, by definition, previously undocumented, they are 
particularly suited to the illegal trade and also pose a particular 
challenge to law and law enforcement.8  For these reasons, this 
Article is limited to discussing looted artifacts that were not 
documented in a public or private collection before their illegal 
removal and entry into the market. 
While a body of general international and national law and lex 
specialis has developed to regulate this trade and thereby reduce 
demand for artifacts, not as much attention has been paid to the 
specific applications of and compliance with this body of law.9  This 
Article aims to address this lacuna by examining the law and its 
enforcement through the lens of the concepts of provenience and 
provenance—both of which are crucial to understanding the 
international market and efforts to control its illegal aspects.10  This 
area of the law is inherently interdisciplinary, intersecting with the 
scholarly disciplines of art history, archaeology, and 
anthropology.11  As a result, the law has borrowed terms, including 
 
mechanism by which the United States can impose restrictions on the import of 
undocumented archaeological materials). 
 8 See Celestine Bohlen, Escalating the War on Looting, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/12/arts/international/escalating-the-war-on-
looting.html [https://perma.cc/DWB6-TDAB] (“But investigations rarely produce arrests 
because of the difficulty in proving the provenance of antiquities, often produced by 
civilizations that stretched across the ancient world.”). 
 9 See generally Gerstenblith, supra note 2, at 172–74 (analyzing the market for 
looted artifacts and what course of action would be best, from a legal perspective, to help 
reign in the demand for and trade in looted materials). 
 10 This article specifically deals with issues of provenance and provenience as related 
to looted archaeological artifacts. For a discussion of other legal issues implicated in the 
black market antiquities trade, see generally Karin Orenstein, Risking Criminal Liability 
in Cultural Property Transactions, 45 N.C. J. INT’L L. 527 (2020) (discussing the 
intersection of laws governing looted art and U.S. criminal law); Leila Amineddoleh, The 
Politicizing of Cultural Heritage, 45 N.C. J. INT’L L. 333 (2020) (discussing the 
repatriation of cultural heritage and the political calculations involved); Stefan Cassella, 
Recovering Stolen Art & Antiquities Under the Forfeiture Laws: Who Is Entitled to the 
Property When There Are Conflicting Claims, 45 N.C. J. INT’L L. 393 (2020) (providing 
an overview of civil asset forfeiture laws and how they work to assist in the recovery of 
looted cultural patrimony).  For a discussion of the comparative considerations involved 
in repatriating looted artifacts and Nazi-looted art, see generally Marc Masurovsky, A 
Comparative Look at Nazi Plundered Art, Looted Antiquities, & Stolen Indigenous 
Objects, 45 N.C. J. INT’L L. 497 (2020) (discussing looted indigenous art, looted 
archaeological artifacts, and Nazi plunder, as well as the sociological implications thereof).   
 11 See infra notes 21–51 and accompanying text.   
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provenience and provenance, from these disciplines.12  Despite the 
essential role that these terms play in both the policy and 
practicalities of the legal framework for controlling the market in 
antiquities, these terms do not have clear legal definitions.13  Rather, 
the law has adopted these terms and their definitions from the 
academic disciplines of art history, archaeology, and anthropology, 
but, in doing so, the law has at times hampered rather than facilitated 
effective law enforcement efforts.14  As the terms serve different 
purposes in these different contexts, it is not surprising that they 
should also have different meanings.15 
By examining the origins of these terms in their art historical, 
archaeological, and anthropological milieus, and the roles that these 
concepts should play in the legal framework, this Article will 
propose legal definitions for the terms “provenience” and 
“provenance” and will consider how these definitions make the law 
more effective in controlling the trade in previously unknown and 
undocumented archaeological artifacts.16  This Article begins with 
a discussion of the terms “provenance” and “provenience” as they 
originated and are understood in the art historical, archaeological, 
and anthropological literature.17  The Article then turns to a brief 
overview of the international legal framework and domestic 
implementation of that framework, whose purpose is to control the 
 
 12 See Klein v. Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 758 F.2d 1511, 
1513 (11th Cir. 1985) (explicitly relying on the way “provenience” is used in the field of 
archaeology). 
 13 See Carrie Betts, Enforcement of Foreign Cultural Patrimony Laws in U.S. Courts: 
Lessons for Museums from the Getty Trial and Cultural Partnership Agreements of 2006, 
4 S.C. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 73, 74–75 (2007) (“Despite its centrality in the art world, no 
uniform rule or custom, or usage of the trade, exists to codify either the precise elements 
of provenance or a standard for how provenance research should be conducted  . . . .”). 
 14 See Gerstenblith, supra note 2, at 178–80 (establishing that it is likely most market 
participants are unconcerned about lack of sufficient provenance information, and that a 
lack of sufficient provenance information makes it difficult for law enforcement actions to 
establish that an artifact was stolen).  See also Jane Levine, The Importance of Provenance 
Documentation in the Market For Ancient Art and Artifacts: The Future of the Market May 
Depend on Documenting the Past, 16 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 219, 229–
32 (sellers’ and museums’ standards to establish appropriate provenance were often 
lacking at best, and there were issues with confidentiality or missing documents, which 
made it relatively easy for stolen or looted articles to be acquired and sold). 
 15 See infra notes 21–51 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 100–200 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 21–51 and accompanying text. 
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market in antiquities.18  Third, the Article will offer definitions of 
“provenience” and “provenance” that are more suitable to the legal 
context and will present examples and justifications for why these 
different definitions are necessary.19  The Article proposes that 
while the concepts of provenience and provenance are useful in 
determining legality and in effectuating law enforcement efforts,20 
the law also needs to adapt these definitions appropriately to their 
legal context in order to accomplish these goals. 
II. Provenance and Provenience 
The anthropologist Rosemary Joyce has focused on the use of 
provenance and provenience in the determination of whether an 
archaeological object is authentic.21  Joyce looked at these terms as 
representing the concepts of place (where is authenticity),22 time 
(when is authenticity),23 and a fluid understanding of the meaning 
of an object’s authenticity as it moves from its origin to its current 
resting place (what is authenticity).24  Particularly for this last 
 
 18 See infra notes 52–99 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 100–200 and accompanying text. 
 20 See id. 
 21 Rosemary A. Joyce, When is Authentic? Situating Authenticity in Itineraries of 
Objects, in CREATING AUTHENTICITY: AUTHENTICATION PROCESSES IN ETHNOGRAPHIC 
MUSEUMS 39, 44 (Alex Geurds & Laura van Broekhaven eds., 2013) [hereinafter Joyce, 
When is Authentic?]. Joyce commented that “authenticity is embroiled in a nexus of place 
and time that  . . .  underlies intertwined archaeological and art historical concepts used to 
secure knowledge: provenience and provenance.”  Id. at 44. 
 22 Id. at 44–48. 
 23 Joyce described the concept of when an object is authentic as “[t]he networks 
composed by circulating objects at a given time are transformed into itineraries unfolding 
in time.  Authenticity becomes, like provenience and provenance, a way to characterize an 
object during its transit, rather than being something inherent in it as a kind of essence, 
lent by some particular circumstances of production or use.”  Id. at 51–54. 
 24 Id. at 48–51.  Kersel identifies three stages in the trafficking of antiquities from 
the ground to the buyer: the archaeologically rich market or country of origin; transit 
markets; and destination markets.  Kersel, supra note 4, at 189–94.  She notes that all three 
stages may exist within a single country, such as in Israel.  Id. at 190–91. However, in the 
paradigm used in this Article, which addresses international law, the various stages are 
located in different countries.  Campbell identified four stages: looter stage; early-stage 
intermediary; late-stage intermediary; and collector.  Peter B. Campbell, The Illicit 
Antiquities Trade as a Transnational Criminal Network: Characterizing and Anticipating 
Trafficking of Cultural Heritage, 20 INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP. 113, 116 (2013).  Both 
authors recognize that numerous actors could be involved at each stage while the same 
actor can fulfill more than one role.  In their study of the looting of Cambodian antiquities 
during the Khmer Rouge period, Simon Mackenzie and Tess Davis found that “antiquities 
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element, the concept of object itineraries is useful in describing the 
movement of objects through time and space.25  Joyce emphasized 
that through the concept of object itineraries, we can see the 
mobility of objects, “the routes by which things circulate in and out 
of places where they come to rest or are active. . . .  Treating things 
as active in transit puts even partial and collective object histories 
into context as segments of potentially unending itineraries that 
shape space and enable action.”26  This Article will apply these 
 
trafficking ‘networks’ might be thought of as more stable, hierarchical and repetitively 
functioning supply chains rather than the highly fluid picture that has been developed both 
in the general organized crime literature and in recent papers in the illicit antiquities sub-
field.”  Simon Mackenzie & Tess Davis, Temple Looting in Cambodia: Anatomy of a 
Statue Trafficking Network, 54 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 722, 737 (2014).  Yates and Smith, 
in contrast to many other authors, examined the middle stage—the trafficking networks 
that move an object from its discovery to current location.  Donna Yates & Emiline Smith, 
Antiquities Trafficking and the Provenance Problem, in COLLECTING AND PROVENANCE: A 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 385, 387 (Jane Milosch and Nick Pearce eds., 2019). 
 25 See Rosemary A. Joyce, Things in Motion: Itineraries of Ulua Marble Vases, in 
THINGS IN MOTION: OBJECT ITINERARIES IN ANTHROPOLOGICAL PRACTICE 21, 29 
(Rosemary A. Joyce & Susan D. Gillespie eds., 2015) [hereinafter Joyce, Things in 
Motion]. 
 26 Id.  Some scholars refer to an object’s biography and see three phases or “lives”: 
first, the history of the object in antiquity before it is buried in the ground; second, the 
burial of the object in the ground with its associated stratigraphic context; and, third, the 
history of the object after its removal from the ground.  See, e.g., Christopher Chippindale 
& David W. Gill, Material Consequences of Contemporary Classical Collecting, 104 AM. 
J. ARCHAEOLOGY 463, 468 (2000).  Compare with Laetitia La Follette, The Impact of the 
1970 UNESCO Convention on Unprovenanced Etruscan Antiquities in the United States, 
in COLLECTING AND COLLECTORS FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERNITY 75, 76 (Alexandra 
Carpina et al. eds., 2018) [hereinafter La Follette, The Impact of the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention] (phrasing these lives slightly differently in that she characterizes the first 
“life” as only the moment of its creation and its immediate milieu; the second as the 
object’s history until its deposition; and the third its post-removal in modern times); see 
also La Follette, The Trial of Marion True, supra note 5, at 44 (noting that art museums 
privilege the first life, whereas the second and third lives are equally important and are 
often more interesting and with greater educational value).  Many scholars prefer the 
concept of object itineraries, rather than biographies, because the former is less static and 
encompasses a broader range of social and other networks for the object.  See, e.g., 
Rosemary A. Joyce & Susan D. Gillespie, Making Things Out of Objects that Move, in 
THINGS IN MOTION: OBJECT ITINERARIES IN ANTHROPOLOGICAL PRACTICE 3, 11–14 
(Rosemary A. Joyce & Susan D. Gillespie eds., 2015); Alexander A. Bauer, The Kula of 
Long Term Loans: Cultural Object Itineraries and the Promise of the Postcolonial 
“Universal” Museum, in THINGS IN MOTION: OBJECT ITINERARIES IN ANTHROPOLOGICAL 
PRACTICE 147, 148–49 (Rosemary A. Joyce & Susan D. Gillespie eds., 2015) (describing 
how the concept of “object itineraries” is useful in understanding the movement of objects 
and correcting for misperceptions around repatriation of artifacts); Morag M. Kersel, 
Itinerant Objects: The Legal Lives of Levantine Artifacts, in THE SOCIAL ARCHAEOLOGY 
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concepts to an exploration of determining the legal status of an 
archaeological object and, more specifically, to proposing legal 
definitions for the terms provenience and provenance.  The same 
concepts of time, place, and quality or meaning of legality may be 
brought to bear in the determination of compliance with 
international and domestic law. 
The terms provenance and provenience have at times been 
considered interchangeable,27 while some scholars viewed 
provenience as referring only to the ownership history of 
archaeological objects, in contrast to the term provenance referring 
to the history of ownership of works of (non-archaeological) fine 
art.28  In the art historical world, the term provenance typically 
indicates the history of the ownership of a work of art from the time 
of its creation.29  The ideal provenance would trace that ownership 
history back to the hands of the artist to establish the twin principles 
 
OF THE LEVANT FROM PREHISTORY TO THE PRESENT 594, 595 (Assaf Yasur-Landau et al. 
eds., 2018). 
 27 According to Joyce, in the late nineteenth century, the term “provenance” was used 
to identify the “stylistic assignment of objects to origins that were not known securely, and 
provenience to identify known find sites, which could be relatively imprecise by modern 
standards  . . . .”.  Joyce, When is Authentic?, supra note 21, at 44.  See, e.g.,  Dennis Mizzi 
& Jodi Magness, Provenance vs. Authenticity: An Archaeological Perspective on the Post-
2002 “Dead Sea Scrolls-Like” Fragments, 26 DEAD SEA DISCOVERIES 135, 137 n.5 (2019) 
(defining the term “provenance” as referring to both an object’s archaeological context and 
its post-discovery history of acquisition and ownership, although acknowledging that 
sometimes these concepts are distinguished through use of the terms “provenience” and 
“provenance,” respectively; to avoid confusion, the authors opted to use only the terms 
provenance and unprovenanced, “in their all-encompassing sense.”). 
 28 See Rosemary A. Joyce, From Place to Place: Provenience, Provenance, and 
Archaeology, in PROVENANCE: AN ALTERNATE HISTORY OF ART 48, 49–51 (Gail 
Feigenbaum & Inge Reist eds., 2012) [hereinafter Joyce, From Place to Place] (setting out 
the history of the two terms and explaining their different uses in archaeology and art 
history, as well as geographical differences in how the terms are used).  Some of the 
distinction is also based on the different etymologies of the two words, although both have 
the same meaning as the place of origin.  Id.  Chippindale and Gill identify “provenience” 
as an American English usage and “provenance” as a British English usage.  Chippindale 
& Gill, supra note 26, at 467.  Clemency Coggins commented that “[t]he differences 
[between anthropological and aesthetic interests] are exemplified by the difference 
between the stark English provenience, meaning the original context of an object, and the 
more melodious French provenance, used by the art world, which may include the original 
source but is primarily concerned with a history of ownership.”  Clemency C. Coggins, 
United States Cultural Property Legislation: Observations of a Combatant, 7 INT’L J. 
CULTURAL PROP. 52, 57 (1998). 
 29 Joyce, When is Authentic?, supra note 21, at 39. 
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of authenticity and legality, both of which are integral to the 
functioning of the art market and to achieving a full and accurate 
understanding of the art historical record.30 
The first publication to analyze in detail the role of provenance 
(or lack thereof) in the archaeological literature was a study, 
authored by David Gill and Christopher Chippindale, of several 
large collections of classical antiquities.31  The authors created a 
rubric for determining the relative reliability of the provenance 
information included in exhibit catalogues of these collections, 
although they acknowledged that it is difficult to evaluate whether 
phrases such as “said to be from,” “probably,” “possibly,” or 
“allegedly” indicate any differences in reliability.32  Both in these 
earlier articles and more recently, Gill has advocated for different 
terminology with respect to archaeological material and suggests 
that the terms “collecting histories” and “archaeology” be used, 
respectively, in place of provenance and provenience.33 
Archaeology identifies the deposition of an object in the 
ground or on a monument.  The collecting history maps 
the trail of the object once it has left the archaeological 
deposit and then passes through the hands of individuals 
or enters public collections.  Indeed it is this documented 
and authenticated collecting history that will ensure that 
the owner, seller, or potential buyer on the market will 
avoid those scandals that have now shadowed classical 
collecting since the mid-1990s.34 
 
 30 Gail Feigenbaum & Inge Reist, Introduction, in PROVENANCE: AN ALTERNATE 
HISTORY OF ART 1, 1–2 (Gail Feigenbaum & Inge Reist eds., 2012) (pointing out that until 
recently provenance was considered a relatively unimportant aspect of a work of art, in 
comparison with the milieu in which the work was created). 
 31 Chippindale & Gill, supra note 26.  In an earlier study, Chippindale and Gill linked 
the appearance of previously undocumented Cycladic figurines of the third millennium 
BCE to the large-scale looting of Cycladic sites.  David W.J. Gill & Christopher 
Chippindale, Material and Intellectual Consequences of Esteem for Cycladic Figures, 97 
AM. J. ARCHAEOLOGY 601, 608–15 (1993). 
 32 Chippindale & Gill, supra note 26, at 469. But see Elizabeth Marlowe, What We 
Talk About When We Talk About Provenance: A Response to Chippindale and Gill, 23 
INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP. 217, 218 (2016) (criticizing this “provenance scale” as detracting 
from the more significant question of whether it is possible to determine the authenticity 
of a decontextualized object). 
 33 David W.J. Gill, Thinking About Collecting Histories: A Response to Marlowe, 23 
INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP. 237, 237 (2016). 
 34 Id.  See generally La Follette, The Trial of Marion True, supra note 5 (discussing 
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Other scholars have advocated for different terms in the hope of 
capturing the significance of an object’s modern history with the 
goal, primarily, of establishing authenticity but also of establishing 
legality.35  Elizabeth Marlowe has rejected use of the terms 
“provenanced” and “unprovenanced.”36  She suggests that the terms 
“grounded” and “ungrounded” should be used to indicate whether 
an object can be traced back to its archaeological find spot in order 
to know conclusively whether it is authentic, regardless of the 
method of its recovery from the ground.37  In Marlowe’s view, “[w]e 
 
the referenced scandals); PETER WATSON & CECILIA TODESCHINI, THE MEDICI 
CONSPIRACY: THE ILLICIT JOURNEY OF LOOTED ANTIQUITIES, FROM ITALY’S TOMB RAIDERS 
TO THE WORLD’S GREATEST MUSEUM (Public Affairs 2007). 
 35 See Elizabeth Marlowe, What We Talk About When We Talk About Provenance: 
A Response to Chippindale and Gill, 23 INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP. 217 (2016). 
 36 An undocumented, “unprovenanced,” or poorly provenanced antiquity is one that 
has poor or only recent evidence of its ownership history and how it was obtained.  La 
Follette, The Trial of Marion True, supra note 5, at 58 (stating that these terms are often 
used to indicate an artifact that was not recovered through systematic archaeological 
excavation or one that lacks “information about both provenance and provenience, that is, 
works that did not come out of an official excavation or a long-established private 
collection.”).  The concept, even if not the exact terminology, is often used more 
specifically in voluntary codes and guidelines of professional organizations.  Such codes 
include those of museum associations, e.g. ASS’N OF ART MUSEUM DIRECTORS, 
GUIDELINES ON THE ACQUISITION OF ARCHAEOLOGICAL MATERIAL AND ANCIENT ART (Jan. 
29, 2013), 
https://aamd.org/sites/default/files/document/AAMD%20Guidelines%202013.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MD39-NGG3]; see also Laetitia La Follette, Looted Antiquities, Art 
Museums and Restitution in the United States since 1970, 52 J. CONTEMPORARY HISTORY 
669, 673–74 (2017) (discussing the exceptions to the 1970 standard adopted by the 
Association of Art Museum Directors).  Professional associations, such as the 
Archaeological Institute of America, also use these terms to indicate an antiquity whose 
existence outside of the modern country of discovery is not documented before 1970, the 
date of adoption of the 1970 UNESCO Convention. See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra 
note 7.  See, e.g., Naomi Norman, Editorial Policy on the Publication of Recently Acquired 
Antiquities, 109 AM. J.  ARCHAEOLOGY 135, 135 (2005).  This is often referred to as the 
“1970 rule” or “1970 standard.”  See also Neil Brodie & Colin Renfrew, Looting and the 
World’s Archaeological Heritage: The Inadequate Response, 34 ANN. REV. 
ANTHROPOLOGY 343, 351 (2005); Patty Gerstenblith, Do Restrictions on Publication of 
Undocumented Texts Promote Legitimacy?, in ARCHAEOLOGIES OF TEXT: ARCHAEOLOGY, 
TECHNOLOGY, AND ETHICS 214 (Matthew T. Rutz & Morag M. Kersel eds., 2014); La 
Follette, The Impact of the 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 26, at 76–78.  For the 
editorial practices of different scholarly journals, see John F. Cherry, Publishing 
Undocumented Texts: Editorial Perspectives, in ARCHAEOLOGIES OF TEXT: 
ARCHAEOLOGY, TECHNOLOGY, AND ETHICS 227, 231–40 (Matthew T. Rutz & Morag M. 
Kersel eds., 2014). 
 37 Marlowe, supra note 35, at 224–25. 
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can never be certain that [artworks without a recorded findspot] are 
what they seem to be, regardless of when they surfaced, their fame, 
the number of decades or centuries they have spent in prestigious 
collections, or the renown of the scholars who have studied them.”38 
The concept of the history of a work of art, when applied to an 
archaeological artifact, is more complex.39  The provenance of an 
archaeological artifact should similarly refer to its history from the 
time of its creation, thereby including the object’s pre-deposition 
history, from the time of its creation to its burial in the ground, its 
deposition, its excavation and its post-discovery history.40  
However, it is very difficult to trace an archaeological object or a 
work of ancient art to the original artist and the moment of its 
creation.  There are some exceptions, including art works that are 
part of immovable monuments, such as the Parthenon in Athens.41 
But such works are traceable only if they have not been 
dismembered and dispersed over time, with their original context 
now lost.  The artist may be known, as in the case of the Euphronios 
krater, if the artist’s name appears on the object itself, but its pre-
deposition history may not be fully known.42  Joyce points out that 
the provenance of Ulua Marble vases should be viewed as beginning 
at the site of Travesia in Honduras, where the vases were produced, 
before their use and subsequent deposition in what became an 
archaeological site.43  On the other hand, the post-deposition or post-
recovery history of an object tells us about modern society—
patterns of looting, archaeological excavation practices, history of 
 
 38 ELIZABETH MARLOWE, SHAKY GROUND: CONTEXT, CONNOISSEURSHIP AND THE 
HISTORY OF ROMAN ART 4 (2013) (criticizing the use of the parallel terms “provenanced” 
and “unprovenanced” because she asserts that the distinction between ownership history 
and findspot is blurred); see also Marlowe, supra note 35, at 218–19.  The potential for 
this confusion is illustrated by the way Mizzi and Magness use the term provenance, see 
Mizzi & Magness, supra note 27; see also La Follette, The Impact of the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention, supra note 26, at 75 (using the term “unprovenanced” to indicate an object 
that was not systematically recovered from the ground).  But see Joyce, When is 
Authentic?, supra note 21, at 41–43 (accepting the authenticity of objects, in this case, 
marble Ulua vases from Honduras, that were acquired for collections before this category 
of object received scholarly publication and became popular on the art market). 
 39 Id. at 49–50. 
 40 See id. 
 41 See, e.g., WILLIAM ST. CLAIR, LORD ELGIN & THE MARBLES: THE CONTROVERSIAL 
HISTORY OF THE PARTHENON SCULPTURES (Oxford University Press 1998). 
 42 Barker, supra note 6, at 26. 
 43 Joyce, When is Authentic?, supra note 21, at 45–46. 
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collecting and aesthetics, and legal changes, among other aspects of 
knowledge.44 
Rosemary Joyce has defined the terms provenance and 
provenience as: 
This distinction illuminates the reason these two concepts 
promote such different understandings: provenience is a fixed 
point, while provenance can be considered an itinerary that an 
object follows as it moves from hand to hand.  Where the two 
concepts intersect is the place that the archaeological provenience 
singles out as the only important location in this itinerary, the find 
site.45 
Joyce further commented that while provenience gives 
archaeological objects a “secure, interpretable context, . . . their 
cultural interpretation rests on knowledge of their provenance[.]”46  
So with the legal understanding of archaeological artifacts, one 
might posit that, from a legal perspective, provenience determines 
what law is initially applicable, while provenance is crucial to 
compliance with the law and to law enforcement efforts as an object 
moves through the market across international borders and to its 
current location.47  Thus, provenience gives a single fixed spot from 
which to begin an analysis of legality, but it is provenance that tells 
the object’s full story from both a legal and contemporary cultural 
perspective beginning in antiquity to the present.48 
This Article will maintain the relatively traditional uses of these 
 
 44 Id. at 46. 
 45 Joyce, From Place to Place, supra note 28, at 48.  Joyce further defines 
provenience in the archaeological context as “a three-dimensional location in space.”  Id. 
at 49.  Barker includes the materials found in association with an object and “the post-
deposition processes that may affect the location and association of objects, deposits or 
their juxtaposition” in that object’s provenience. See Barker, supra note 6, at 19–20 
(stating that “context refers to the association of an object that allows its importance or 
significance to be assessed . . .  [and] nearly always refers to the significance of the object 
within one or more cultural-historical or theoretical constructs based upon provenience.”). 
 46 Joyce, When is Authentic?, supra note 21, at 46. 
 47 Megan Winget, The Archival Principle of Provenance and Its Application to 
Image Content Management Systems, U. TEX. LIBRARIES 1, 3–5 (Aug. 26, 2008), 
https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/412/Winget_ProvenanceImage
Mgmt.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BHW-9TS6]. 
 48 Bauer, supra note 26, at 148–49 (extending the object itinerary and thus, by 
extension, its provenance to include subsequent circulation that is not limited to transfers 
of ownership but also transfers of physical possession through loans, such as among 
museums). 
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terms, while suggesting modifications for legal purposes.  The legal 
definition of provenance should be limited to indicating the history 
of the ownership of an archaeological object only from the time of 
its modern discovery.  While the pre-deposition history of an object 
is significant from an archaeological, art historical, and 
anthropological perspective, this is not relevant to the legal status of 
an artifact.  In contrast to the art historical milieu, for legal purposes 
in the case of archaeological artifacts, the history of ownership and 
disposition of an object and, hence, its provenance, should be 
viewed as beginning at the time of its “removal . . . from its context 
of archaeological recovery,”49 rather than from the time of its 
creation.50  The term provenience, as adapted for legal purposes, is 
used to indicate the archaeological findspot and therefore 
depositional or stratigraphic context of an archaeological object, but 
findspot should be defined only as the country within whose borders 
the object was discovered.  Although provenance and its 
documentation are often considered of primary importance for 
establishing the authenticity of a work of art,51 this Article focuses 
 
 49 Joyce, From Place to Place, supra note 28, at 48; see also Joyce, When is 
Authentic?, supra note 21, at 45 (noting that the findspot is the intersection of location and 
provenance). 
 50 La Follette, The Impact of the 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 26, at 80–
81 (arguing that provenience is significant for information about both an object’s second 
life—how it was used in antiquity and whether it moved from point of creation to other 
locations—and the object’s third life). 
 51 Provenance documentation is considered by the art world and, especially the art 
market, as key to establishing the authenticity of a work of art.  Fake provenance 
documentation is typically used in the attempt to make inauthentic works of art appear to 
be authentic.  However, fake provenance documentation may also be used to establish the 
appearance of legality of an authentic but illegal archaeological artifact.  See United States 
v. Schultz, 178 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d, 333 F.3d 393, 416 (2d Cir. 2003), 
cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1106 (2004) (illustrating perhaps the best-known example of forged 
provenance documentation used to establish the legality of an authentic antiquity); Peter 
Watson, The Investigation of Frederick Schultz, 10 CULTURE WITHOUT CONTEXT: NEWSL. 
ILLICIT ANTIQUITIES RES. CTR. 21, 25 (2002) (discussing Schultz’s smuggling of artifacts 
out of Egypt).  In Schultz, a British conservator, Jonathan Tokeley-Parry, and a prominent 
New York antiquities dealer, Frederick Schultz, conspired to smuggle artifacts out of 
Egypt by disguising them as modern tourist trinkets.  Tokeley-Parry established a fake old 
collection, dubbed the Thomas Alcock collection, purportedly created by a relative in the 
1920s, and assigned several of the smuggled artifacts to this collection.  In furtherance of 
this deception, Tokeley-Parry created old labels, using old typewriters, and discolored 
them, again, to make them look old.  See also Patty Gerstenblith, Provenances: Real, Fake 
and Questionable, 26 INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP. 285, 288–91 (2019) (discussing the 
question of authenticity of art works and the use of forged or unreliable documentation).  
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on the roles that provenance and provenience play in establishing 
the legal status of an archaeological artifact, particularly in terms of 
the international legal framework that attempts to regulate the 
market in archaeological artifacts. 
III. The International Legal Framework for Controlling the 
Market in Antiquities 
The international legal framework for regulating the market in 
antiquities consists primarily of two elements.52  The first is the 
broad international conventions, the 1970 UNESCO Convention on 
the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export 
and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (1970 UNESCO 
Convention),53 and the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen and 
Illegally Exported Cultural Objects (the 1995 UNIDROIT 
Convention),54 as well as the domestic laws of the States Parties that 
implement the provisions of the conventions into domestic law.  The 
second element of international law pertaining to the trade in 
archaeological artifacts is the recognition granted to statutes vesting 
ownership of undiscovered archaeological artifacts in the State.55  
When such artifacts are looted and removed from the country of 
discovery without permission, the artifacts are characterized as 
stolen property, as case law in the major market countries of the 
 
In 2019, the Metropolitan Museum of Art returned a coffin to Egypt that had been looted 
in 2011.  The Metropolitan purchased the coffin on the basis of a forged export license, 
which indicated the coffin had been exported in 1971.  Nancy Kenney, Looted Coffin 
Acquired by Metropolitan Museum is Headed Back to Egypt, THE ART NEWSPAPER (Sept. 
26, 2019), https://www.theartnewspaper.com/news/looted-coffin-acquired-by-
metropolitan-museum-is-headed-back-to-egypt [https://perma.cc/KMY2-MFD9]. 
 52 See CRAIG FORREST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL 
HERITAGE 133 (Routledge 2010). 
 53 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 7; see also PATRICK J. O’KEEFE, 
PROTECTING CULTURAL OBJECTS: BEFORE AND AFTER 1970 (Institute of Art and Law 2017) 
(providing a comprehensive review of the Convention). 
 54 Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, June 24, 1995, 34 
I.L.M. 1322 [hereinafter UNIDROIT Convention]; see also LYNDEL V. PROTT, 
COMMENTARY ON THE UNIDROIT CONVENTION (Institute of Art and Law 1997) (providing 
a comprehensive review of the Convention). 
 55 FORREST, supra note 52, at 150–53. 
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United States56 and the United Kingdom has established.57 
A. The 1970 UNESCO Convention and its Domestic 
Implementation by Market States 
Both the 1970 UNESCO Convention and the 1995 UNIDROIT 
Convention regulate the international trade in illegally obtained 
archaeological objects, as well as other forms of cultural property.58  
However, the 1970 UNESCO Convention has received broader 
ratification, particularly among market countries, and it has 
therefore had a greater impact on the international trade in 
antiquities.59  The 1970 UNESCO Convention, which as a part of 
public international law operates on a State-to-State basis, permits 
considerable variation in the method of implementation adopted by 
the different States Parties with a corresponding significant 
variation in effectiveness.60 
On the other hand, the UNIDROIT Convention is a part of private 
international law, and implementing legislation creates private 
rights of action for recovery of stolen and illegally exported cultural 
objects.61  It was drafted to appeal to the States that had adopted 
some form of the good faith purchaser doctrine, which mandates 
that a good faith purchaser can acquire title to stolen property or is, 
at the least, entitled to compensation if the purchaser is required to 
 
 56 See United States v. Schultz, 178 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d, 333 F.3d 
393 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977) (recognizing 
the principle of foreign State ownership); United States v. McClain, 593 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 
1979). 
 57 Iran v. Barakat Galleries Ltd, [2007] EWHC (QB) 705, rev’d, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 
1374, [2008] 1 All ER 1177 (UK). 
 58 See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 7; see also UNIDROIT Convention, 
supra note 54. 
 59 See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 7 (documenting 140 current States 
Parties to the 1970 UNESCO Convention, including the market countries of Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, China, France, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, United Kingdom, 
and United States); UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects 
(Rome, 1995) – Status, UNIDROIT, https://www.unidroit.org/status-cp 
[https://perma.cc/K2HX-EVNE] (last updated Dec. 2, 2019) (documenting 47 States 
Parties, but the only market countries to have ratified it are Italy and China). 
 60 See O’KEEFE, supra note 53, at 56. 
 61 See UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects (Rome, 
1995) – Status, UNIDROIT (Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.unidroit.org/status-cp 
[https://perma.cc/K2HX-EVNE]. 
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return a stolen object to its original owner.62  The UNIDROIT 
Convention requires full implementation of its provisions with little 
variation,63 which has proven to be an obstacle to wider State 
ratification.64 
Most States Parties to the 1970 UNESCO Convention 
implement Article 3,65 which states that “[t]he import, export or 
transfer of ownership of cultural property effected contrary to the 
provisions adopted under this Convention by the States Parties 
thereto, shall be illicit.”66  In contrast, U.S. implementation focuses 
on Article 9,67 which applies only to archaeological and ethnological 
materials.68  Among market countries, one may discern four models 
 
 62 O’KEEFE, supra note 53, at 56–57. 
 63 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 54, art. 18 (not permitting any reservations to 
the Convention other than those expressly authorized by the Convention). 
 64 See UNIDROIT, UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural 
Objects (Rome, 1995) – Status (July 16, 2019), https://www.unidroit.org/status-cp 
[https://perma.cc/K2HX-EVNE]. 
 65 See O’KEEFE, supra note 53, at 135–38. 
 66 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 7, art. 3.  The term “cultural property” is 
defined in Article 1 of the Convention and applies to a broad range of objects of artistic, 
historical, archaeological, ethnological and scientific interest. Id. 
 67 Article 9 of the 1970 UNESCO Convention states: 
Any State Party to this Convention whose cultural patrimony is in 
jeopardy from pillage of archaeological or ethnological materials may 
call upon other States Parties who are affected.  The States Parties to 
this Convention undertake, in these circumstances, to participate in a 
concerted international effort to determine and to carry out the 
necessary concrete measures, including the control of exports and 
imports and international commerce in the specific materials 
concerned.  Pending agreement each State concerned shall take 
provisional measures to the extent feasible to prevent irremediable 
injury to the cultural heritage of the requesting State. 
Id. art. 9. 
 68 Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act (CPIA), 19 U.S.C. §§ 2602–
2603 (2018). The import of undocumented archaeological and ethnological materials into 
the United States is restricted under the U.S. implementing legislation, the Convention on 
Cultural Property Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2613, only pursuant to either a 
bilateral or multilateral agreement (Memorandum of Understanding) or an emergency 
action.  While the 1970 UNESCO Convention defines neither term, the CPIA adopts the 
following definitions: 
The term “archaeological or ethnological material of the State Party” 
means — 
(A) any object of archaeological interest; 
(B) any object of ethnological interest; or 
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of implementation:69 (1) reciprocal import restrictions, which 
implement Article 3;70 (2) bilateral agreements implementing 
Article 3 (Switzerland)71 or Article 9 (United States);72 (3) hybrid 
approaches incorporating principles of the 1995 UNIDROIT 
Convention;73 and (4) reliance on an inventory or list principle or a 
requirement of documentation.74 
 
(C) any fragment or part of any object referred to in subparagraph 
(A) or (B); which was first discovered within, and is subject to 
export control by, the State Party. For purposes of this paragraph 
— 
(i) no object may be considered to be an object of 
archaeological interest unless such object — 
(I) is of cultural significance; 
(II) is at least two hundred and fifty years old; and 
(III) was normally discovered as a result of scientific 
excavation, clandestine or accidental digging, or 
exploration on land or under water; and 
(ii) no object may be considered to be an object of 
ethnological interest unless such object is — 
(I) the product of a tribal or nonindustrial society, and 
(II) important to the cultural heritage of a people 
because of its distinctive characteristics, comparative 
rarity, or its contribution to the knowledge of the 
origins, development, or history of that people. 
Id. § 2601(2).  The United States implements other provisions, including Article 7(b)(i) 
and parts of Articles 1, 5 and 6.  Article 7(b)(i) calls on States Parties to prohibit the import 
of stolen cultural property that was documented in the inventory of a “museum or a 
religious or secular public monument or similar institution.”  19 U.S.C. § 2607 (2019). 
 69 See Patty Gerstenblith, Implementation of the 1970 UNESCO Convention by the 
United States and Other Market Nations, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO CULTURAL 
PROPERTY 70, 71–72, 78–86 (Jane Anderson & Haidy Geismar eds., 2017). 
 70 Examples include: Canada, Cultural Property Export and Import Act, R.S.C. 1985, 
c C-51 § 37(2) (Can.); Australia, Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act, pt II div 2 
s 14 sub 1 (as amended in 2011) (Austl.); Germany, Kulturgutschutzgesetz vom 31 [Act 
on the Protection of Cultural Property], July 20, 2016, BGBL 1 at 1914 (Ger.). I had 
previously referred to this model of implementation as “across-the-board” import 
restrictions. Gerstenblith, supra note 69, at 79. 
 71 Bundesgesetz über den internationalen Kulturgütertransfer [KGTG][Federal Act 
on the International Transfer of Cultural Property (Cultural Property Transfer Act)] June 
20, 2003, SR 444.1, art 7 (Switz.). 
 72 Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act (CPIA), 19 U.S.C. §§ 2602–
2603 (2018). 
 73 See infra notes 75–86. 
 74 The only country to adopt this last approach is Japan, but its implementing law is 
not useful in preventing the import or trade in looted archaeological artifacts as it applies 
only to stolen artifacts that were documented in a public collection.  O’KEEFE, supra note 
53, at 204–05.  For this reason, Japan’s implementation of the convention will not be 
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The third model of implementation, adopting a hybrid approach, 
requires additional explanation.  Without ratifying it, these States 
Parties incorporate principles from the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention.  
Article 3(2) of the UNIDROIT Convention states that “a cultural 
object which has been unlawfully excavated or lawfully excavated 
but unlawfully retained shall be considered stolen, when consistent 
with the law of the State where the excavation took place.”75  The 
Netherlands is an example of a hybrid approach.76  It follows the 
reciprocal model of implementation of Article 3 of the 1970 
UNESCO Convention in that it prohibits the import of any 
cultural property which: has been removed from the territory of a 
State Party and is in breach of the provisions adopted by that State 
Party, in accordance with the objectives of the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention in respect of the export of cultural property from that 
State Party or the transfer of ownership of cultural property.77 
However, the legislation goes a step further in also prohibiting 
the import of cultural property that “has been unlawfully 
appropriated in a State Party.”78  The Explanatory Memorandum 
that accompanied the legislation clarifies that unlawful 
appropriation includes “unlawful excavation at archaeological 
sites” and explicitly references the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention’s 
equation of unlawful excavation with theft.79  Furthermore, this 
provision applies even without establishing that an export control 
has been violated.80 
The United Kingdom has arguably taken a hybrid approach; 
although, unlike the Netherlands, it does not explicitly state this.81  
 
further considered here. 
 75 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 54, art. 3(2). 
 76 The Explanatory Memorandum that accompanied enactment of the Netherlands’ 
legislation makes clear that it was influenced by various aspects of the 1995 UNIDROIT 
Convention.  Explanatory Memorandum to the Implementing Act 1970 UNESCO 
Convention, Parliamentary Documents II 2007/08, 31 255, No. 3, 2–4 [hereinafter 
Explanatory Memorandum]. 
 77 Wet van 9 december 2015, houdende bundeling en aanpassing van regels op het 
terrain van cultureel erfgoed (Erfgoedwet) [Act of 9 December 2015, Relating to the 
Combining and Amendment of Rules Regarding Cultural Heritage (Heritage Act)] § 
6.3(a). 
 78 Id. § 6.3(b). 
 79 Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 76, at 24. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Dealing in Cultural Objects (Offences) Act 2003, c. 27 (UK). 
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The United Kingdom did not enact specific implementing 
legislation for the 1970 UNESCO Convention, although soon after 
ratifying the Convention, it enacted a criminal statute, the Dealing 
in Cultural Objects (Offences) Act 2003, which has served as a 
means of seizing “tainted objects” upon import82 and incorporates 
provisions that are clearly based on Article 3(2) of the 1995 
UNIDROIT Convention.83  The legislation defines a “tainted object” 
as one that is removed from “a building or structure of historical, 
architectural or archaeological interest” or from an excavation.84  
The offense is committed “if  . . . (a) a person removes the object in 
a case falling within subsection (4) or he excavates the object, and 
(b) the removal or excavation constitutes an offence.”85  It does not 
matter whether the excavation or removal took place in the United 
Kingdom or in another country or whether the law violated is a 
domestic or foreign law.86 
Other States that have ratified both conventions, such as Italy, 
have incorporated a similar system of import controls based on the 
export controls adopted by other countries through the 1970 
UNESCO Convention and the equation of illegal excavation with 
theft based on the UNIDROIT Convention.87  While not an 
implementation of either the 1970 UNESCO Convention or the 
1995 UNIDROIT Convention, the European Union has had internal 
controls on the import and export of cultural goods since 1992.88  In 
2019, the European Commission adopted a regulation to control the 
import of cultural objects from all non-EU Member States.89 
 
 82 Id.  One commits the offense of dealing in tainted cultural objects by “dishonestly 
deal[ing] in a cultural object that is tainted, knowing or believing that the object is tainted.”  
Id. § 1(1). 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. § 2(4)–(5). 
 85 Id. § 2(2). 
 86 Id. § 2(3). 
 87 Decreto n.42: codice dei beni culturali e del paesaggio [Code of the Cultural and 
Landscape Heritage], D.Lgs. n.42, Jan. 22, 2004, G.U. Supp. n.45, Feb. 24, 2004, art. 87 
(It.) (implementing the UNIDROIT Convention). 
 88 See Council Regulation 116/2009, O.J. (L 39) 1 (EC); Council Directive 
2014/60/EU, O.J. (L 159) 1 (EU). 
 89 Regulation 2019/880 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 
2019 on the Introduction and the Import of Cultural Goods, 2019 O.J. (L 151) para. 5.  The 
European Union had previously imposed import restrictions on cultural goods illegally 
removed from the non-Member States of Iraq, Council Regulation (EC) 1210/2003 of 7 
July 2003 concerning certain specific restrictions on economic and financial relations with 
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B. State Ownership 
The second primary legal mechanism for dealing with the 
problem of looted and undocumented archaeological artifacts is 
State ownership.90  Many nations rich in archaeological resources 
have vested ownership of undiscovered archaeological artifacts in 
the State, as a means both of protecting sites from looting and of 
imposing consequences on those who engage in looting, 
intermediaries and final purchasers.91  Objects that are subject to 
national ownership are characterized as stolen property when they 
are removed without permission of the State.  In United States v. 
Schultz92 the Second Circuit recognized the effectiveness of foreign 
vesting laws and, in affirming the conviction of the dealer Frederick 
Schultz, held that the laws of the country of discovery determined 
ownership of the object, but that dealing in and transporting such 
objects in the United States constituted a violation of U.S. law, 
including the National Stolen Property Act.93 
In a comparable, but civil rather than criminal action, the Court 
of Appeal in the United Kingdom similarly held that Iran’s national 
ownership law established a sufficient right of immediate 
possession that Iran could sue a London dealer to recover artifacts 
 
Iraq and repealing Regulation [2003] OJ L169/ 6, and Syria, Council Regulation (EU) 
1332/2013 of 13 December 2013 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation 
in Syria and amending Regulation (EU) 36/2012 concerning restrictive measures in view 
of the situation in Syria, OJ L335, 14.12.2–13, p. 3. 
 90 See, e.g., FORREST, supra note 52, at 150–53. 
 91 Free market proponents, such as James Cuno, have argued that the modern State 
has no right to claim artifacts based solely on the fact that the artifacts were excavated 
within their modern territorial borders.  James Cuno, Art Museums, Archaeology, and 
Antiquities in an Age of Sectarian Violence and Nationalist Politics, in THE ACQUISITION 
AND EXHIBITION OF CLASSICAL ANTIQUITIES: PROFESSIONAL, LEGAL AND ETHICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 9, 23–24 (Robin F. Rhodes ed., 2007). See also Bauer, supra note 26, at 
151; Dennis P. Doordan, Response to Malcolm Bell, in THE ACQUISITION AND EXHIBITION 
OF CLASSICAL ANTIQUITIES: PROFESSIONAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES 43, 44 
(Robin F. Rhodes ed., 2007). 
 92 United States v. Schultz, 178 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d, 333 F.3d 
393 (2d Cir. 2003).  The Fifth Circuit had previously recognized the principle of foreign 
State ownership in United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977); United States 
v. McClain, 593 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 93 Schultz, 333 F.3d at 402–03; National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314–
2315 (2019) (prohibiting the transport or transfer “in interstate or foreign commerce [of] 
any goods  . . .  for the value of $5,000 or more” as well as receiving, possessing, storing, 
selling, or disposing of such goods with knowledge that they were stolen). 
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looted from Iran.94  While arguably applying a less stringent analysis 
in its evaluation of the Iranian law than the Second Circuit applied 
to the Egyptian vesting law in Schultz, the Court of Appeal 
distinguished vesting laws from export controls.95  It acknowledged 
that such vesting laws were an effective means of protecting 
archaeological heritage and congruent with British public policy, 
stating that “[i]n our judgment, there are positive reasons of policy 
why a claim by a state to recover antiquities which form part of its 
national heritage and which otherwise complies with the 
requirements of private international law should not be shut out.”96 
The McClain and Schultz decisions set out four elements 
required for a U.S. court to recognize that an undocumented 
archaeological object is owned by a foreign State: (1) the vesting 
law must be clearly an ownership law on its face;97 (2) the State’s 
ownership rights must be enforced domestically and not only upon 
illegal export or attempted illegal export; (3) the object must have 
been discovered within the territorial boundaries of the country 
claiming ownership; and (4) the object must have been located 
within the country at the time the law was enacted.98  The purpose 
of the third requirement is to ensure that the ownership law is not 
given extraterritorial effect and the purpose of the fourth 
requirement is to ensure that the ownership law is not given 
retroactive effect.99  The legal roles of provenience and provenance 
are particularly relevant in determining whether the third and fourth 
requirements are satisfied. 
IV. Legal Roles of Provenience and Provenance 
The two prongs of the international legal regime establish the 
legal definitions of provenance and provenience and their roles in 
regulating the market in antiquities.  These concepts complement 
each other, and both are crucial to proper application of the 1970 
 
 94 Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. The Barakat Galleries Ltd [2007] 
EWHC 705 (QB), rev’d, [2007] EWCA Civ 1374; [2008] 1 All ER 1177. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Barakat Galleries Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 1374; [2008] 1 All ER 1177, ¶¶ 154–55. 
 97 Schultz, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 447; McClain, 545 F.2d at 997–1002.  As these 
elements are deduced from two criminal prosecutions, it is not certain whether the same 
standard of clarity would be required in non-criminal litigation, such as a civil replevin 
action or a civil forfeiture action. 
 98 McClain, 545 F.2d at 997–1002. 
 99 See id. 
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UNESCO and 1995 UNIDROIT Conventions and the principle of 
State ownership in the interdiction and recovery of looted 
archaeological artifacts.  While the provenience of an 
archaeological object or at least the country of modern discovery is 
the first step in determining the initial applicable law, the 
provenance of an object further informs the legal status of the object 
at the time of its interdiction by law enforcement. 
A. Where is Legality? The Problem of Location 
In the first three models of implementation of the 1970 
UNESCO Convention, reciprocal restrictions, bilateral agreements, 
and hybrid models,100 knowing the provenience—that is, the place 
of modern discovery or at least the country of modern discovery—
is a necessary element in effectuating the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention.101  The examples of Germany, which utilizes reciprocal 
import restrictions implementing Article 3,102 and the United States, 
which relies on bilateral agreements in implementing Article 9,103 
illustrate this point.  Those countries utilizing reciprocal import 
restrictions prohibit the import of any cultural property that is 
subject to export restriction from the country of origin.104  
Germany’s implementing legislation requires an importer to present 
documentation that the cultural property was legally exported if it 
left another State Party to the 1970 UNESCO Convention after 
2007, the date of Germany’s ratification of the Convention.105  The 
importer bears the burden to present such documentation and, in the 
absence of such documentation, the cultural property is presumed 
to have been unlawfully removed from the relevant State Party after 
2007.106 
 
 100 See Gerstenblith, supra note 69. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. at 81–83. 
 103 Id. at 73. 
 104 Id. at 79–81. 
 105 FED. GOV’T COMM’R FOR CULTURE & THE MEDIA, KEY ASPECTS OF THE NEW ACT 
ON THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY IN GERMANY 7 (Sept. 2016). Under earlier 
legislation, Germany prohibited the import of only those illegally exported cultural objects 
that had been individually classified in an accessible inventory by the country of origin at 
least one year prior to removal (termed the “list principle”). O’KEEFE, supra note 53, at 
195. 
 106 Key Aspects of the New Act on the Protection of Cultural Property in Germany, 
supra note 105. 
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The United States implements Article 9 of the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention through a series of bilateral agreements that restrict the 
import of archaeological and, in some cases, ethnological 
materials107 that fall into a designated category of such materials and 
that left the country of modern discovery without an export license 
after the date the import restriction went into effect.108  Because the 
import of objects is restricted only if the United States has a bilateral 
agreement with the country of discovery or has imposed import 
restrictions pursuant to an emergency action, it is crucial to know 
the provenience of an archaeological object in order to know 
whether the import restriction applies to it.109  The United States 
currently (as of early 2020) has bilateral agreements with 20 
countries, an emergency action for cultural materials from Yemen, 
and emergency import restrictions pursuant to special legislation for 
cultural materials from Iraq and Syria.110 
The difficulty of establishing the country of discovery is 
exacerbated by the fact that artifacts may have moved in antiquity 
as part of their history before their deposition111 and that the 
boundaries of modern countries are not necessarily congruent with 
ancient cultures.112  For example, the United States currently 
restricts the import of archaeological materials from ten modern 
countries that at one time were part of the Roman Empire,113 while 
the Roman Empire at various times spanned the borders of 
approximately 40 modern countries.114  Differences in style, 
 
 107 See supra note 68 (defining archaeological and ethnological materials). 
 108 19 U.S.C. § 2606 (1983). 
 109 19 U.S.C. § 2601(2)(C) (1983) (defining archaeological or ethnological material 
in part as “any fragment or part of any object  . . .  which was first discovered within, and 
is subject to export control by, the State Party”). 
     110 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, CULTURAL PROPERTY AGREEMENTS, 
https://eca.state.gov/files/bureau/cultural_property_agreements.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3QDG-4D46]. Requests for bilateral agreements to impose import 
restrictions are currently pending from Chile, Morocco, Yemen, Tunisia and Turkey. 
 111 See, e.g., infra note 117–18. 
 112 See, e.g., infra notes 114–15. 
 113 Current Import Restrictions, BUREAU OF EDUC. & CULTURAL AFF.,  U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE, https://eca.state.gov/cultural-heritage-center/cultural-property-advisory-
committee/current-import-restrictions [https://perma.cc/WZT8-WA67]. 
 114 Donald L. Wasson, The Extent of the Roman Empire, in ANCIENT HISTORY 
ENCYCLOPEDIA (Jan. 5, 2016), https://www.ancient.eu/article/851/the-extent-of-the-
roman-empire/ [https://perma.cc/FP9Z-A7XY]. 
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material composition115 and other factors among the cultural objects 
produced in different parts of the Roman Empire may allow 
determination of the location of discovery if the object did not 
“travel” in antiquity.116  Knowing the provenience (and therefore the 
country of modern discovery) of an object is crucial to knowing 
whether import of the object is restricted under the CPIA.  In 
addition, objects frequently moved in antiquity through territory 
that is now part of different modern countries.  For example, Attic 
black and red-figured pottery of the sixth and fifth centuries BCE 
was produced in the region of Athens that is today in the modern 
country of Greece.117  However, the best preserved and the most 
aesthetically admired examples are, for the most part, found in 
Etruria in modern Italy.118 
The question then becomes how to establish the provenience of 
an artifact.  It is important to note that the archaeological or 
anthropological definition of provenience depends on the exact 
findspot of an artifact.119  In contrast, the legal definition of 
provenience is the country within whose modern borders the object 
in question was discovered.  Use of the archaeological or 
 
 115 Technical analyses of the material of an artifact may be of significant help in 
determining the country of origin.  However, it is not always possible to determine whether 
a particular deposit of clay or type of stone occurs within the boundaries of only one 
country and, on the other hand, a high degree of specificity is not necessarily required as 
to the precise provenience.  Finally, to the extent that technical analysis of composition 
may indicate the place where the raw materials originated, this may not be the same as the 
place of manufacture or, more important for legal purposes, the place of discovery (that is, 
the provenience). 
 116 See generally Richard Neer, Connoisseurship and the Stakes of Style, 23 U. CHI. 
CRITICAL INQUIRY J. 1, 3–5 (Autumn 2005) (discussing the role of connoisseurship and 
stylistic analysis in attributions of archaeological artifacts). 
 117 Department of Greek and Roman Art, Athenian Vase Painting: Black- and Red-
Figure Techniques, in HEILBRUNN TIMELINE OF ART HISTORY, NEW YORK: THE 
METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART (Oct. 2002), 
http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/vase/hd_vase.htm [https://perma.cc/XPL4-35FH]. 
 118 Barker, supra note 6, at 26 (discussing the Euphronios krater).  Vessels of these 
types appear on the designated lists for the bilateral agreements between the United States 
and both Greece and Italy.  Import Restrictions Imposed on Certain Archaeological and 
Ethnological Material from Greece, 76 Fed. Reg. 231, 74691, 74694 (Dec. 1, 2011); 
Extension of Import Restrictions Imposed on Archaeological Material Originating in Italy 
and Representing the Pre-Classical, Classical, and Imperial Roman Periods (Italy), 76 Fed. 
Reg. 12, 3012, 3014 (Jan. 19, 2011).  See also Nathan T. Elkins, Ancient Coins, Find Spots, 
and Import Restrictions: A Critique of Arguments Made in the Ancient Coin Collectors 
Guild’s “Test Case,” 40 J. FIELD ARCHAEOLOGY 236, 240 (2015). 
 119 See Joyce, From Place to Place, supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
480 N.C. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XLV 
anthropological definition of exact findspot is not necessary120 and 
may defeat effective law enforcement efforts if the U.S. government 
were to refuse to pursue a case because the exact find spot is not 
known.  In some cases, the determination of the country of 
discovery may be relatively straightforward, if some distinctive 
feature, perhaps an inscription, ties the object directly to a site,121 if 
a fragment of the same object is discovered at the site,122 or if a 
witness observed the looting or there is other direct evidence 
indicating or illustrating the object in the process of being looted.123  
While this determination must often be made based on indirect or 
 
 120 See Ancient Coin Collectors Guild v. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 801 F. 
Supp. 2d 383, 408–09 (D. Md. 2011), aff’d, 698 F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2012) (noting that the 
law does not require the precise find spot to be determined), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1251 
(2013); United States v. 3 Knife-shaped Coins, 246 F. Supp. 3d 1102 (D. Md. 2017), aff’d 
sub nom., United States v. Ancient Coin Collectors Guild, 899 F.3d 295 (4th Cir. 2018), 
cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1191 (2019). 
 121 Writing on artifacts may indicate the provenience of an object.  Depending on their 
type or function, cuneiform tablets may have been buried where they were written and so 
finding the name of a city mentioned in a text would indicate where it was found.  For 
example, the tablets acquired by Hobby Lobby dealt with mundane subjects such as 
recording food allocations for palace officials and land allocations.  Such tablets would 
have been written and buried within the same city.  Owen Jarus, Lost City of Irisagrig 
Comes to Life in Ancient Stolen Tablets, LIVE SCIENCE (May 30, 2018), 
https://www.livescience.com/62688-lost-city-of-irisagrig-ancient-tablets.html 
[https://perma.cc/UR7L-9D2J].  However, other types of cuneiform tablets were part of 
the trade in goods in antiquity and so, while a city name may be mentioned in a text, this 
may not be the place where the tablet was discovered.  For example, an extensive trade 
was carried on in the early second millennium BCE between the Old Assyrian trading 
colonies, such as Karum Kanesh, located in central Turkey, and Mari, located in the eastern 
part of what is today Syria, and other cities in northern Mesopotamia.  A looted tablet 
could be identifiable as belonging to this time period and genre, but it may not be possible 
to discern from its contents whether it was found in Turkey, Syria or Iraq.  UNESCO, 
Archaeological Site of Kültepe-Kanesh, https://whc.unesco.org/en/tentativelists/5905/ 
[https://perma.cc/6464-UA2D] (last visited Oct. 1, 2019). 
 122 The lower half of a Roman sculpture of the “Weary Herakles” type was excavated 
at the site of Perge in southwestern Turkey, while the upper half had been looted, 
purchased by New York collectors Shelby White and Leon Levy, and eventually displayed 
at the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston.  It took over ten years from the time of the acquisition 
of the looted half in 1981 before a comparison of a plaster cast of the portion in Turkey 
with the part in Boston established that the site of Perge was the findspot of the Boston 
piece.  This part of the sculpture was returned to Turkey in 2011.  Suzie Thomas, Weary 
Herakles, TRAFFICKING CULTURE, https://traffickingculture.org/encyclopedia/case-
studies/weary-herakles/ [https://perma.cc/7MWK-EEPA] (last modified Dec. 31, 2012). 
 123 THOMAS HOVING, MAKING THE MUMMIES DANCE 217 (1994) (explaining that a 
Metropolitan Museum of Art junior curator was present at the looting of the Lydian Hoard 
from tombs in Western Turkey). 
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circumstantial evidence, both direct and indirect evidence are 
admissible in court proceedings.124 
The burden of establishing country of origin in the case of an 
archaeological artifact is mitigated through the types of evidentiary 
burden and the shifting of that burden applicable in civil forfeitures 
under both the CPIA and under the more generic Customs statute.125  
In civil forfeiture actions under the Customs statute (found in Title 
19), the generally-applicable burden-shifting statute provides that, 
in all forfeiture actions brought against “any . . . merchandise[] or 
baggage seized under the provisions of any law relating to the 
collection of duties on imports or tonnage . . . the burden of proof 
shall lie upon [the] claimant,” although the government must first 
demonstrate probable cause that the property is subject to 
forfeiture.126 
 
 124 See COMM. ON FED. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIR., PATTERN 
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 12 (2012 ed., rev. 2018),  
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/pattern-jury-instructions/7th_criminal_jury_instr.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M685-QDSQ] (last visited Sept. 26, 2019) (“Direct evidence is evidence 
that directly proves a fact.  Circumstantial evidence is evidence that indirectly proves a 
fact . . . [t]he law does not say that one is better than the other.”).  Direct evidence is 
something that the observer saw; indirect evidence is evidence of a fact that may be 
inferred from direct evidence.  See United States v. $99,990.00 in U.S. Currency, 69 F. 
App’x 757, 763 (6th Cir. 2003) (the amount of money being carried at the time of seizure, 
as well as the manner in which it was packed, sufficed to meet the evidentiary requirements 
placed upon the government to justify a forfeiture).  Unlike direct evidence, circumstantial 
evidence allows courts to evaluate the “totality of the circumstances.”  Id.  In civil 
forfeiture cases, courts use circumstantial evidence to determine whether the government 
has met its burden.  Id.  The types of and amount of weight given to circumstantial evidence 
varies. Id. 
 125 Stefan D. Cassella, Using the Forfeiture Laws to Protect Archaeological 
Resources, 41 IDAHO L. REV. 129, 135–36 (2004).  Forfeiture actions are in rem 
proceedings in which the defendant is the property and the claimant is anyone who asserts 
an interest in the property at issue, such as an importer or purchaser.  Id. at 132–33. 
 126 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (2019).  See United States v. Davis, 648 F.3d 84, 88 (2d Cir. 
2011) (applying the burden shifting framework of 19 U.S.C. § 1615 to a stolen painting).  
The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act changed several aspects of civil forfeiture law.  
Stefan D. Cassella, The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000: Expanded Government 
Forfeiture Authority and Strict Deadlines Imposed on All Parties, 27 J. LEGIS. 97, 97 
(2001).  CAFRA changed the government’s burden of proof to the preponderance of the 
evidence standard and added an innocent owner defense.  Id.  However, CAFRA, 18 
U.S.C. §983(i), excludes from these requirements forfeiture proceedings brought under the 
Customs statute (Title 19), including forfeitures under the CPIA.  Id. at 104. See also 
Cassella, Recovering Stolen Art & Antiquities Under the Forfeiture Laws: Who Is Entitled 
to the Property When There Are Conflicting Claims, supra note 10 (discussing the role of 
civil asset forfeiture in recovering looted art and artifacts). 
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In CPIA forfeitures,127 the government has the initial burden to 
establish that the material subject to import restriction has been 
listed in accordance with 19 U.S.C. § 2604.128  In Ancient Coin 
Collectors Guild v. U.S. Customs and Border Protection,129 the 
Fourth Circuit elaborated that this means that the government must 
establish that the seized material has been (1) listed by type or other 
appropriate classification on the Designated List, and (2) listed in a 
manner that gives fair notice to importers of those materials that 
cannot be imported.130  Once the government has met its initial 
burden of proof to the probable cause standard, the burden shifts to 
the importer to prove that one of the exceptions under 19 U.S.C. § 
2606 applies.131  The importer must prove that the objects are 
importable to a preponderance of the evidence standard.132 
Courts have considered the extent of the burden to establish the 
precise findspot or even the country of discovery of an 
archaeological artifact when the U.S. government pursues a civil 
forfeiture action under the CPIA.  In United States v. Eighteenth 
Century Peruvian Oil on Canvas Painting,133 involving illegally 
exported Colonial period paintings, there was a question as to 
whether the paintings originated from Bolivia or from Peru.134  
However, as the same categories of ethnological objects were 
covered by the bilateral agreements with both countries,135 the court 
 
 127 See 19 U.S.C. § 2606 (2018) (import restrictions on archaeological and 
ethnological materials); 19 U.S.C. § 2610 (2018) (evidentiary requirements governing § 
2606). 
 128 United States v. Eighteenth Century Peruvian Oil on Canvas Painting of the 
“Doble Trinidad,” 597 F. Supp. 2d 618, 623 (E.D. Va. 2009). 
 129 Ancient Coin Collectors Guild v. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 698 F.3d 
171 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 130 Id. at 181; United States v. Ancient Coin Collectors Guild, 899 F.3d 295, 314–15 
(4th Cir. 2018).  See also Eighteenth Century Peruvian Oil on Canvas Painting of the 
“Doble Trinidad,” 597 F. Supp. 2d at 623.  The ACCG case is discussed in Elkins, supra 
note 118. 
 131 Eighteenth Century Peruvian Oil on Canvas Painting of the “Doble Trinidad,” 
597 F. Supp. 2d at 622. 
 132 Id. at 622–23; Ancient Coin Collectors Guild, 698 F.3d at 181–83.  The CPIA 
allows objects to be imported under several affirmative defenses. 19 U.S.C. § 2606 (2018). 
 133 Eighteenth Century Peruvian Oil on Canvas Painting of the “Doble Trinidad,” 
597 F. Supp. 2d at 618. 
 134 Id. at 624–25. 
 135 19 C.F.R. § 12.104–12.104(i) (2019); Import Restrictions Imposed on 
Archaeological and Ethnological Materials from Bolivia, 66 Fed. Reg. 63,490 (notice of 
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did not find it necessary to determine which country was the country 
of origin.136  This approach is limited, however, to the circumstance 
in which all of the likely modern countries of origin have a bilateral 
agreement with the United States that covers the same categories of 
objects.137 
In Ancient Coin Collectors Guild, which involved coins subject 
to import restriction pursuant to U.S. bilateral agreements with 
China and with Cyprus, the district court further elaborated on the 
government’s burden to establish provenience, stating: 
For each designated type of coin . . . , coins could fall into one of 
three categories depending on whether there is documentation of 
where a coin was discovered, known as its “find spot”: (1) coins 
that are proven to have been discovered in modern-day China or 
Cyprus, (2) coins that are proven to have been discovered 
somewhere other than China or Cyprus, and (3) coins for which 
the “find spot” is unknown.  ACCG concedes that the State 
Department has authority to prohibit the importation of coins in 
the first category.  The government concedes that it does not have 
authority to prohibit coins in the second category.  The parties’ 
dispute is limited to whether the State Department has authority 
under the CPIA to prohibit the importation of coins with unknown 
“find spots” . . . .  [I]f there is no record of when and where the 
coin was discovered, or of when it was exported from Cyprus, 
then importation of the coin is prohibited.  This result, ACCG 
argues, violates the “first discovered” requirement in the CPIA. 
 ACCG’s argument misses the mark . . . .  [T]he CPIA anticipates 
that there may be some archeological objects without precisely 
documented provenance and export records and prohibits the 
importation of those objects . . . . Thus for objects without 
documentation of where and when they were discovered, the 
CPIA expressly places the burden on importers to prove that they 
are importable, and prohibits the importation of those objects if 
they cannot meet that burden. 
 
final rule Dec. 7, 2001) (codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 12); Extension of Import Restrictions 
Imposed on Archaeological and Ethnological Materials from Peru, 82 Fed. Reg. 26340 
(notice of final rule June 7, 2017) (codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 12). 
 136 United States v. Eighteenth Century Peruvian Oil on Canvas Painting of the 
“Doble Trinidad,” 597 F. Supp. 2d 618, 624–25 (E.D. Va. 2009). 
 137 For this reason, the designated lists that accompany the various Memoranda of 
Understanding should be written to be congruent to the extent that similarities in material 
culture permit. 
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* * * 
[I]nterpreting the “first discovered in” requirement to preclude the 
State Department from barring the importation of archaeological 
objects with unknown find spots would undermine the core 
purpose of the CPIA, namely, to deter looting of cultural 
property . . . .  Looted objects are, presumably, extremely unlikely 
to carry documentation, or at least accurate documentation, of 
when and where they are discovered and when they were exported 
from the country in which they were discovered.  Congress is 
therefore unlikely to have intended to limit import restrictions to 
objects with a documented find spot.138 
It is worth noting that the court adopted the definition of find spot 
(that is, provenience) as the country of discovery and not a specific 
archaeological site.139 
In the Ancient Collectors Guild litigation, the ACCG argued that 
the government had imposed import restrictions on types of ancient 
coins based on their place of production rather than on their place 
of discovery.140  However, this argument ignored three points.  First, 
certain types of coins tended not to circulate from their place of 
production.141  Second, the archaeological evidence demonstrates 
the high probability that the designated types of coins produced in 
Cyprus would be discovered in Cyprus, and that coins minted 
outside of Cyprus but likely to be discovered in Cyprus were 
included on the designated list for Cyprus.142  This point needs to be 
understood in light of the government’s low evidentiary burden, 
which requires less than a fifty percent likelihood under the 
probable cause standard.143  Third, as the number of countries within 
which the same types of coins circulated in antiquity increases, the 
government does not need to establish exactly which of those 
 
 138 Ancient Coin Collectors Guild v. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 801 F. 
Supp. 2d 383, 408–09 (D. Md. 2011), aff’d, 698 F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 139 See id. (referring to find spots as the countries where coins came from and not the 
specific archaeological sites). 
 140 801 F. Supp. 2d at 406–07. 
 141 Elkins, supra note 118, at 238. 
 142 Id. at 238–41 (discussing the listing of ancient coins in the U.S. agreements with 
Cyprus, Italy, Greece and Bulgaria).  Elkins points out that the analysis of the import 
restrictions on ancient coins should parallel that of the restriction on import of ancient 
vessels that may be discovered in either Greece or Italy.  Id. 
 143 Ancient Coin Collectors Guild, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 399 n.11. See also 19 U.S.C. § 
1615 (2018) (laying out the burden of proof for this type of forfeiture proceeding). 
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countries is the country of discovery.144 
In light of this analysis, it is clear that under the CPIA the 
government does not have the burden to prove the exact find spot 
of an archaeological object.145  Further, to the extent that the 
government needs to establish the country of discovery, it needs to 
meet only the probable cause evidentiary standard.146  Finally, if the 
country of discovery is unknown, the burden falls on the importer 
to prove that the provenience of the object at issue is not the country 
with which the United States has a bilateral agreement.147 
Characterizing an archaeological object as stolen property 
pursuant to State ownership also requires knowledge of the 
provenience of the object.  The object must have been discovered 
within the borders of the country claiming ownership at the time the 
vesting statute was enacted, so as to avoid extraterritorial 
application of the statute.148  Therefore, the government has the 
same challenge to establish the country of discovery.149  A country 
could bring a claim as a private litigant to recover such 
archaeological artifacts on the ground that they are stolen property 
but then has the initial burden of establishing the country of 
discovery to the preponderance of the evidence standard.150  While 
 
 144 See  United States v. Eighteenth Century Peruvian Oil on Canvas Painting of the 
“Doble Trinidad,” 597 F. Supp. 2d 618, 625–26 (E.D. Va. 2009) (finding that it did not 
matter if the paintings that the government sought to forfeit came from Bolivia or Peru). 
 145 Ancient Coin Collectors Guild v. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 801 F. 
Supp. 383, 408–09 (D. Md. 2011), aff’d, 698 F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 146 See supra note 143. 
 147 See Ancient Coin Collectors Guild, 801 F. Supp. at 408–09 (“Thus for objects 
without documentation of where and when they were discovered, the CPIA expressly 
places the burden on importers to prove that they are importable, and prohibits the 
importation of those objects if they cannot meet that burden.”).  To some extent, this 
shifting of the burden of proof onto the importer to prove (or disprove) the country of 
discovery is parallel to the shifting of the burden of proof under the German law 
implementing the 1970 UNESCO Convention.  See Key Aspects of the New Act on the 
Protection of Cultural Property in Germany, supra note 105. 
 148 McClain, 545 F.2d at 1001–03; Peru v. Johnson, 720 F. Supp. 810, 812 (C.D. Cal. 
1989), aff’d sub nom., Peru v. Wendt, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 10385, *4–*5 (9th Cir. 
1991). 
 149 See Schultz, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 447; McClain, 545 F.2d at 997–1003. 
 150 Republic of Turkey v. OKS Partners, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17032 (D. Mass. 
1994) (bringing suit to recover hoard of rare ancient coins, known as the “Elmali Hoard”); 
Republic of Turkey v. Metro. Museum, 762 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (suit to recover 
group of 360 antiquities, known as the “Lydian hoard”).  Both cases settled with virtually 
all objects returned to Turkey after preliminary litigation.  For restitution of the Lydian 
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countries have brought such claims in the past, at this time, in what 
may be termed “second generation” cultural property cases, the U.S. 
government undertakes most such cases in the form of civil 
forfeitures on behalf of the foreign owner in which the government 
must prove the elements of its claim only to the probable cause 
standard.151   Such forfeiture cases are typically pursued under the 
“contrary to law” provision of the Customs statute,152 but the 
 
hoard, see Lawrence M. Kaye & Carla T. Main, The Saga of the Lydian Hoard: from Usak 
to New York and Back Again, in ANTIQUITIES: TRADE OR BETRAYED—LEGAL, ETHICAL 
AND CONSERVATION ISSUES 150–51 (Kathryn W. Tubb ed. 1995).  A civil forfeiture action 
should be distinguished from a civil replevin action. In the latter case, the country as 
plaintiff must establish its right of ownership, which means it would have the initial burden 
of proving by the preponderance of the evidence standard the provenience of the artifact 
or at least the country of modern discovery. Patty Gerstenblith, Criminal Law and 
Forfeiture in the Recovery of Cultural Objects, in ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL 
HERITAGE LAW 150, 160–62 (Francesco Francioni & James Gordley eds. 2013). 
 151 Id. at 167–71.  A civil forfeiture claim is less likely to be barred by a statute of 
limitation or laches defense in comparison to a private replevin action.  Id.; 19 U.S.C. §§ 
1615, 1621 (2018) (barring civil forfeiture and other actions under the customs laws five 
years after the time when the alleged offense was discovered or, in the case of forfeiture, 
within two years after the time when the involvement of the property in the alleged offense 
was discovered, whichever is later).  A suit to recover stolen property in a private replevin 
action is generally subject to the statute of limitation enacted by the forum state in which 
the suit is brought; while the time period is highly variable, it ranges typically from two to 
six years but is also subject to judicial determination of the accrual of the cause of action.  
For a summary of relevant court decisions in the context of works of art and cultural 
property, see generally Patty Gerstenblith, Statutes of Limitation and Other Legal 
Challenges to the Recovery of Stolen Art, in THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF ART CRIME 
271, 274–79 (Saskia Maria Hufnagel & Duncan Chappell eds. 2019). 
 152 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c)(1)(A) (2018).  See also infra note 186. The import of stolen 
property is prohibited under the National Stolen Property Act (NSPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314–
2315 (2018) (prohibiting, inter alia, the transport across an international boundary of 
stolen goods valued at $5000 or more with knowledge that the goods were stolen).  The 
proceeds of a violation of the NSPA are directly forfeitable under CAFRA, 18 U.S.C. § 
981(a)(1)(C).  However, because of the less favorable burden of proof and the availability 
of an innocent owner defense under CAFRA, forfeitures of stolen property would likely 
be pursued under 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c)(1)(A) in which the law in the “contrary to law” 
element would be the NSPA.  The government would still need to show that the importer 
knew that the property was stolen but would only need to establish knowledge to the 
probable cause standard rather than to the criminal standard. For discussion of CAFRA, 
see supra note 126.  The CPIA does not require any knowledge or scienter on the part of 
the importer and, like all forfeiture actions under Title 19, has no innocent owner defense.  
While CAFRA poses a problem for forfeiture of antiquities and other cultural objects that 
originate in and are transported only interstate, all antiquities discussed in this article were 
discovered in other countries and therefore entered the United States at some point.  
Therefore, in such cases, the provisions of the Customs statute will always be a potential 
avenue for the government to pursue civil forfeiture. 
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handling of stolen property can also be the basis for criminal 
prosecutions.153 
B. When is Legality? The Problem of Time 
It is a basic principle of international law that laws and treaties 
are not retroactive in nature—in other words, they have no legal 
effect until after a particular country has ratified the treaty and, in 
some cases, enacted domestic implementing legislation.154  This is 
true not only of the 1970 UNESCO Convention, the 1995 UNIDROIT 
Convention and the various statutes by which these conventions are 
implemented into domestic law, but it is also true of States’ 
ownership statutes.155  The latter means that the archaeological 
artifact has to have been located within the country of discovery at 
the time the vesting law was enacted.156  Thus is posed not only the 
problem of determining the provenience, but also the provenance of 
the object.  While archaeologists and anthropologists consider the 
pre-deposition history of an artifact as part of its history,157 from a 
 
 153 See, e.g., United States v. McClain, 545 F. 2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977), appeal after 
remand, 593 F. 2d 658 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Schultz, 178 F. Supp. 2d 445 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d, 333 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 154 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states: 
Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise 
established, its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or 
fact which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before the 
date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to that party. 
art. 28, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.  Domestic implementing legislation is required 
for the terms of a treaty to be enforceable domestically in the case of non-self-executing 
(executory) treaties.  It is more likely that multilateral treaties will be interpreted as non-
self-executing, while bilateral treaties are more likely to be treated as self-executing.  
Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505–14 (2008); see also Jean Galbraith, Making Treaty 
Implementation More Like Statutory Implementation, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1309, 1316–20 
(2017); Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 695, 695–97 (1995). 
 155 O’KEEFE, supra note 53, at 101 (explaining that the 1970 UNESCO Convention 
has no provision on retroactivity because this was understood not to be necessary); 
UNIDROIT Convention, art. 10 (1)–(2) (stating that the Convention applies only to cultural 
objects that were stolen or illegally exported after the entry into force of the Convention); 
United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 1000–03 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that only 
artifacts exported after Mexico’s enactment of a national vesting law were owned by 
Mexico). 
 156 Schultz, 333 F.3d at 398 (describing Egypt’s vesting law as applying to artifacts 
discovered after 1983). 
 157 Kersel and others have considered at length the pre-deposition history of an 
archaeological object as part of its itinerary and provenance.  Kersel, Itinerant Objects, 
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legal perspective, the pre-deposition history of an artifact is not 
relevant.  The legal definition of provenance is the history of 
ownership of an object from the time of its modern discovery.  In 
most cases, only by knowing the chain of ownership and the 
different steps by which the object moved can one determine the 
time at which the object left the country of discovery and therefore 
what laws are applicable as it moves through the market and across 
borders.158 
Establishing when an artifact left its country of discovery is, if 
anything, even more difficult than establishing the country of 
discovery.  A terminus post quem (that is, a time after which) for 
the discovery of the artifact may place the object securely within the 
country of discovery up to a certain point in time.  Often this date 
can be determined only by tracing the provenance of the object back 
to at least its time of export.  A verified, documented provenance 
would be direct evidence of this time of removal.  For example, in 
United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold,159 the government was 
able to establish the provenance of the phiale and its movement 
from the time of its discovery in Sicily, through the hands of various 
looters, smugglers and dealers, to the time it was removed illegally 
from Italy and imported into the United States.160  Such evidence is 
not always available, but circumstantial evidence may fill the gap. 
An example of circumstantial evidence is the study done by 
Ricardo Elia of Apulian red-figure vases.161  Apulian red-figure 
vases were produced in southern Italy during the fourth century 
BCE.162  Two researchers, A.D. Trendall and Alexander 
Cambitoglou, published lists of over 14,000 Apulian vases known 
 
supra note 26, at 596–99. 
 158 See United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, known as a Gold Phiale 
Mesomphalos c. 400 B.C., 991 F. Supp. 222, 224–27 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d, 184 F.3d 
131, 133 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied sub nom. Steinhardt v. United States, 528 U.S. 1136 
(2000). 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id., 991 F. Supp. at 224–27, 184 F.3d at 133. 
 161 Ricardo J. Elia, Analysis of the Looting, Selling and Collecting of Apulian Red-
Figure Vases: a Quantitative Approach, in TRADE IN ILLICIT ANTIQUITIES: THE 
DESTRUCTION OF THE WORLD’S ARCHAEOLOGICAL HERITAGE 145 (Neil Brodie, Jennifer 
Doole & Colin Renfrew eds., 2001).  La Follette discusses the possibility of reconstructing 
provenance for Attic pottery based on the work of J.D. Beazley. La Follette, The Trial of 
Marion True, supra note 5, at 56. 
 162 Elia, supra note 161, at 146. 
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as of the year 1979, along with their then current locations and 
owner, previous owners, and findspot.163  Subsequent publications 
covered additional vases that surfaced between 1980 and 1992.164  
Elia’s study of these publications indicated that 99.4 percent of the 
vases with a definitive findspot were found within Italy.165  While 
Apulian vases have been collected for over 200 years and have been 
widely dispersed to collections throughout the world, the Trendall 
and Cambitoglou publications allow the inference to be drawn that 
any vase not present in these publications first appeared after 
1992.166  These publications provide a terminus post quem for time 
of discovery of any vase that does not appear in these 
publications.167  Italy has vested ownership of archaeological 
artifacts in the State since at least 1939;168 those vases first appearing 
after 1980 would therefore be considered State property and would 
be characterized as stolen.169  On the other hand, the U.S.-Italy 
Memorandum of Understanding under the CPIA dates only to 
January 2001.170  Knowing whether an artifact left Italy before or 
after 2001 would be crucial in determining the MOU could be used 
by the United States to recover and return the object. 
In a few instances, a looted object may be recontextualized, 
thereby giving both the exact findspot and the time at which the 
artifact was discovered.171  Malcolm Bell was able to 
recontextualize the “Morgantina treasure,” a group of fifteen silver 
objects of Hellenistic date looted in 1980-1981 from the site of 
Morgantina in central Sicily and purchased by the Metropolitan 
Museum of Art soon after.172  Re-excavation of the area where the 
treasure was looted allowed identification of the exact findspot and 
 
 163 Id. at 145. 
 164 Id. at 146. 
 165 Only 945 of the vases had definitive findspots; of these, only five were found 
outside of Italy.  Id. at 146–47. 
 166 Id. at 146. 
 167 Id. at 150–52. 
 168 United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, known as a Gold Phiale Mesomphalos 
c. 400 B.C., 991 F. Supp. 222, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d, 184 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 
1999). 
 169 Id. 
 170 Memorandum of Understanding, It.-U.S., Jan. 19, 2001, T.I.A.S. No. 11-119. 
 171 Malcolm Bell III, Italian Antiquities in America, 7 ART ANTIQUITY & L. 195, 202–
03 (2002). 
 172 Id. See also La Follette, The Trial of Marion True, supra note 5, at 40. 
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a more accurate dating of the original deposit of the objects, as well 
as a determination of when the objects were looted.173 
C. What is Legality? Objects in Transit 
An illegal antiquity is one whose history or handling involves 
some violation of law. As has previously been discussed, an 
antiquity may be characterized as stolen property if it is removed 
from its country of modern discovery in violation of a national law 
vesting ownership of antiquities in the State174 or it may be subject 
to export or import restriction or both.175  In line with Joyce’s third 
paradigm for determining authenticity,176 we must also consider 
how an object’s legal status may change as it moves internationally 
and crosses the final border of the country where it is located at the 
time of its interception.  Thus, an object that was illegally excavated 
or one that was legally obtained but illegally exported may be legal 
in a transit or destination country whose laws have not been violated 
by such conduct.  Even a stolen object may be considered legally 
obtained in a country that recognizes the good faith purchaser 
doctrine.177  A legal object may become illegal if it is improperly 
 
 173 See Bell III, supra note 171, at 202–03; La Follette, Looted Antiquities, Art 
Museums and Restitution, supra note 36, at 685. 
 174 Supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text. 
 175 Supra notes 68–89 and accompanying text. 
 176 As Joyce wrote, “[W]hat we consider authentic is fluid, because things themselves 
were and continue to be in motion, both literally (as ownership changes, as physical storage 
location changes, and as things move about for exhibition) and metaphorically, as things 
are debated, published, challenged, interrogated, and even, prosaically, merely 
catalogued.”  Joyce, When Is Authentic?, supra note 21, at 54. 
 177 The continental European countries have adopted the good faith purchaser 
doctrine, under which a good faith purchaser may be able to acquire title to stolen property, 
in contrast to the rule of common law countries, such as the United States, where a thief 
can never convey title. Charles A. Palmer, Recovering Stolen Art: Avoiding Pitfalls, 82 
MICH. B. J. 20, 22 (June 2003) (discussing how common law and civil law differ in their 
approach to good faith purchasers). Transferring stolen property to a good faith purchaser 
in a country that follows the good faith purchaser doctrine allows title to be laundered. Id. 
Courts in common law countries use a choice of law or conflicts of law analysis to decide 
whether to apply the good faith purchaser doctrine. See generally Patricia Youngblood 
Reyhan, A Chaotic Palette: Conflict of Laws in Litigation Between Original Owners and 
Good-Faith Purchasers of Stolen Art, 50 DUKE L. J. 955 (2001). European courts typically 
use the lex situs rule—that is, they apply the law of the jurisdiction where movable property 
was located at the time of the transaction by which the current possessor claims to have 
acquired title. Id. at 1014. In two cases involving cultural objects, British courts chose to 
apply the law of a foreign jurisdiction, Islamic Republic of Iran v. Berend, [2007] EWHC 
132 (QB), [2007] 2 All ER (Comm) 132 (applying French law), and Winkworth v. Christie, 
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imported into the country where it is currently located.178  Or, 
conversely, an object that is illegally exported from one country is 
not illegal in an importing country in the absence of adherence to an 
agreement, such as the 1970 UNESCO Convention, by which the 
importing country makes illegal export from another country a 
violation of the law of the importing country.179  This variation in 
applicable laws allows title to objects, particularly to antiquities, to 
be laundered if they are passed through or are ultimately located in 
countries whose laws do not regard them as illegal.180 
An understanding of an object’s post-discovery provenance will 
elucidate an object’s trajectory as it changes legal status while 
crossing international borders.  However, for practical purposes, the 
relevant status is the status of the object in the country where it is 
intercepted by law enforcement or where a claimant brings suit to 
 
Manson & Woods Ltd [1980] 1 Ch 496 1 All E.R. 1121, [1980] 2 WLR 7 (applying Italian 
law). However, in City of Gotha v. Sotheby’s, [1998] 1 WLR 114 (Q.B. 1998), the court 
refused to apply German law under the exceptions to the lex situs rule where the current 
possessor is the thief or has acted in bad faith or where applying the law of a foreign 
jurisdiction would be contrary to English public policy. In the United States, courts 
typically choose to apply the law of the jurisdiction where the property is located at the 
time of suit or the jurisdiction that is considered to have the most significant contacts with 
the gravamen of the suit. See, e.g., Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136, 143–45 (2d Cir. 2010). 
In some cases, U.S. courts have considered the law of a foreign jurisdiction in an 
alternative analysis. See, e.g., Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. 
Goldman & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1393–95 (S. Ind. 1989) (applying 
Indiana law but also discussing Swiss law), aff’d, 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990), and Greek 
Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem v. Christie’s, Inc., No. 98 CIV. 7664 (KMW), 1999 
WL 673347, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (applying New York law but also discussing French 
law). In Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found., where jurisdiction was based 
on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, the court applied the substantive law of Spain 
pursuant to federal common law. 862 F.3d 951, 960–64 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 178 Patty Gerstenblith, The Legal Framework for the Prosecution of Crimes Involving 
Archaeological Objects, 64 U.S. ATT’YS BULL. 5, 8 (2016). 
       179 Robert K. Paterson, The Legal Dynamics of Cultural Property Export Controls: 
Ortiz Revisited, U.B.C. L. REV. (Special Issue) 241, 247–50 (1995); see also Paul M. 
Bator, An Essay on the International Trade in Art, 34 STANFORD L. REV. 275, 287 (1982) 
(“The fact that an art object has been illegally exported does not in itself bar it from lawful 
importation into the United States; illegal export does not itself render the importer (or one 
who took from him) in any way actionable in a US. court; the possession of an art object 
cannot be lawfully disturbed in the United States solely because it was illegally exported 
from another country”).  
 180 Thomas W. Pecoraro, Choice of Law in Litigation to Recover National Cultural 
Property: Efforts at Harmonization in Private International Law, 31 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 
(1990) (“Stolen works are generally ‘laundered’ through a series of sales to buyers with 
progressively less knowledge of the work’s taint.”). 
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recover the object as that is the jurisdiction with physical control of 
the object. For this purpose, the manner in which a cultural object 
enters a country plays a significant role in the ultimate 
determination of whether an object may be recovered and returned 
to the country of origin.181 
Countries typically require the declaration upon import of 
commercial goods or goods with a value above a certain amount.182  
While the details vary considerably by country, the requirements for 
a declaration include the country of origin, the value of the goods, 
and what the goods are.183  These declarations determine whether 
the goods are importable and the amount of customs duty or tariff 
that the importer must pay.184  In the case of typical commercial 
goods, “country of origin” usually refers to the place of manufacture 
or a place where substantial changes were made to the goods.185  
While a false declaration may be made to mislead a Customs agent, 
the false declaration is itself another violation of the law and may 
constitute a distinct basis for forfeiture.186 
Several cases demonstrate the use of false declarations directly 
related to the importation of artifacts into the United States.187  Case 
 
 181 See Palmer, supra note 177. 
 182 See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. §1484 (a) (1) (2019). 
 183 See, e.g., U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, IMPORTING INTO THE UNITED 
STATES: A GUIDE FOR COMMERCIAL IMPORTERS (last revised 2006), 
https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Importing%20into%20the%20U.S.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/SE2U-MDVC]. 
 184 DAMON V. PIKE & LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CUSTOMS LAW 25, 71 (2012). The 
United States exempts works of art from the payment of tariffs. Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act 
of 1909, ch. 6, 36 Stat. 11 §§ 714–717. 
 185 PIKE & FRIEDMAN, supra note 184, at 281. 
 186 18 U.S.C. § 542 (2019) (“Whoever enters or introduces . . . into the commerce of 
the United States any imported merchandise by means of any fraudulent or false invoice, 
declaration  . . .  or by means of any false statement  . . .  or makes any false statement in 
any declaration without reasonable cause to believe the truth of such statement  . . .  [shall 
be guilty of a crime].”). A false declaration constitutes an importation contrary to law and 
may be a violation of either 18 U.S.C. § 545 (2019) (“Whoever fraudulently or knowingly 
imports or brings into the United States, any merchandise contrary to law . . . [shall be 
subject to criminal penalties]. . . . Merchandise introduced into the United States in 
violation of this section . . . shall be forfeited to the United States”) or 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c) 
(2019) (“Merchandise which is introduced or attempted to be introduced into the United 
States contrary to law shall be treated as follows: (1) The merchandise shall be seized and 
forfeited if it—(A) is stolen, smuggled or clandestinely imported or introduced.”). The 
former is a criminal provision while the latter authorizes civil forfeiture. 
 187 See, e.g., United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, known as a Gold Phiale 
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law clearly indicates that the country of origin is the provenience or 
country of modern discovery, rather than the place of manufacture 
or production in antiquity.188  In one of the earlier modern cultural 
property cases, a gold phiale discovered in Sicily was imported into 
the United States through the use of false declarations as to country 
of origin, which was stated to be Switzerland, through which the 
phiale was transported, rather than Italy, where the bowl was 
discovered, and as to value, which was declared as $250,000, 
although the dealer had purchased it for $1.2 million.189  The bowl 
was forfeited and returned to Italy.190 
In a more recent case, the Hobby Lobby Corporation forfeited 
to the U.S. government approximately 3,450 ancient cuneiform 
tablets and clay bullae acquired for its Museum of the Bible, as well 
as an additional 144 cylinder seals and $3 million.191  In this case, 
the archaeological artifacts, which originated in Iraq, were falsely 
declared as to what they were (declared to be ceramic tiles), their 
country of origin (falsely stated to be Turkey and Israel), and their 
value, which was stated to be significantly lower in order to utilize 
an informal entry process thereby attempting to evade Customs 
scrutiny.192  Citing to the false declarations, as well as other legal 
violations,193 the U.S. government forfeited these artifacts as 
imported contrary to law.194  The resolution of this case provides 
further support for the legal definition of provenience as the country 
of discovery, as suggested here, and not necessarily the specific 
findspot.  It is known, based on the textual information in the tablets, 
that the tablets originated from an ancient city called “Irisaĝrig” and 
that Irisaĝrig is located in southern Iraq.  However, the exact 
location and therefore the exact findspot of these tablets are not 
 
Mesomphalos c. 400 B.C., 184 F.3d 131, 133 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 188 Id. at 135. 
 189 Id. at 133. 
 190 Id. 
 191 United States v. Approximately Four Hundred Fifty (450) Cuneiform Tablets, 
17CV03980 (E.D.N.Y. 2016). 
 192 Id. at ¶¶ 33–42. 
 193 Id. at ¶¶ 7–10, 50–52.  These other violations included export in violation of Iraq’s 
national ownership laws and import in violation of U.S. import restrictions under the 
CPIA. 
 194 Id. The forfeiture of $3 million was as substitute res in place of “dissipated” 
property or merchandise imported or attempted to be imported between 2009 and 2011.  
Id. ¶ 11. 
494 N.C. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XLV 
known.195  Because Irisagrig can be located in southern Iraq, the 
legal conclusion can be drawn that the artifacts originated in Iraq, 
thereby subjecting the artifacts to the legal rules based on Iraq’s 
national ownership law and the restrictions on import of antiquities 
from Iraq. 
Two similar smuggling attempts of ancient artifacts were 
interdicted in the United Kingdom.  One also involved a group of 
cuneiform tablets, which were falsely declared upon entry at 
Heathrow Airport.196  Their country of origin was declared to be the 
United Arab Emirates, they were described as handmade miniature 
clay tiles, and they were given an implausible valuation.197  Scholars 
at the British Museum subsequently identified them as originating 
at the sites of Umma, Larsa, and the unknown site of Irisaĝrig, all 
of which are located within modern Iraq.198  In another example, 
U.K. customs authorities seized and returned an ancient Greek 
sculpture that was found at the site of Cyrene in Libya.199  Upon 
import into the United Kingdom, its country of origin was declared 
to be Turkey and its value to be £72,000, rather than its actual worth 
that was later estimated to be £1.5 million.200 
 
 195 MARCEL SIGRIST AND TOHRU OZAKI, TABLETS FROM THE IRISAĜRIG ARCHIVE 
(Eisenbrauns 2020); Owen Jarus, 1,400 Ancient Cuneiform Tablets Identified from Lost 
City of Irisagrig in Iraq. Were they Stolen?, LIVE SCIENCE (Jan. 6, 2020), 
https://www.livescience.com/lost-city-in-iraq-cuneiform-
tablets.html?fbclid=IwAR1F4hwm4PyAIUyy0M_lkw34qsVacVynhxKDgzUBnho77W
w4UirpXi4Uli0 [https://perma.cc/EV36-FDA2]. This additional cache of 1,400 tablets 
from Irisagrig are said to be owned by Hobby Lobby but were not among the artifacts 
returned to Iraq pursuant to the forfeiture action. United States v. Approximately Four 
Hundred Fifty (450) Cuneiform Tablets, et al., 17CV03980 (E.D.N.Y. 2016). 
 196 Jonathan Taylor (@JonTaylor_BM), TWITTER (Aug. 30, 2019, 4:57 AM), 
https://twitter.com/JonTaylor_BM/status/1167405875168010240 
[https://perma.cc/SEM4-7YRT]. The tablets are likely to be associated with the Hobby 
Lobby tablets. 
 197 Id. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Agency, Ancient Greek Relic Looted from Libya to be Returned, THE TELEGRAPH 
(Sept. 1, 2015) 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/earth/environment/archaeology/11837886/Ancient-
Greek-relic-looted-from-Libya-to-be-returned.html [https://perma.cc/P6FU-PQSA]. 
 200 HM Revenue & Customs v. Al Qassas, unpublished, Westminster Magistrates 
Court (Sept. 1, 2015); Neil Brodie, The Role of Conservators in Facilitating the Theft and 
Trafficking of Cultural Objects: the Case of a Seized Libyan Statue, 48 LIBYAN STUD. 117, 
118 (2017); Ancient Greek Relic Looted from Libya to be Returned, THE TELEGRAPH (Sept. 
1, 2015), 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/earth/environment/archaeology/11837886/Ancient-
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V. Conclusion 
The terms provenience and provenance appear frequently in 
both the legal literature and case law and in the scholarly literature 
of the disciplines of art history, archaeology, and anthropology.  To 
understand the role that these concepts play in the latter context 
when applied specifically to previously unknown archaeological 
artifacts that were looted from the ground, the definition of 
provenience as the find spot and of provenance from the time of the 
creation of the object to its time of deposition and then its post-
deposition history is appropriate.  However, in order to apply these 
concepts in the legal realm the definitions of these terms must be 
altered. 
This Article has proposed that the legal definition of 
provenience, while still technically applying to the precise find spot, 
indicates the modern country within whose borders the object was 
discovered, whether through excavation or through looting.  The 
legal definition of the term provenance is the history of the 
ownership and custody of the artifact from the time of its modern 
discovery to its present location, thus omitting its ancient, pre-
deposition history.  In this way, these terms that derive from the 
disciplines of art history, anthropology, and archaeology, on the one 
hand, and are used in the discipline of law, on the other, can be 
clarified and better understood.  These definitional terms reflect the 
dimensions of time, space and movement that form an object’s legal 
itinerary and allow these concepts to be better understood in their 
legal context and application.  This is the first step in achieving an 
accepted legal definition for these terms so that laws can be more 
effectively devised and enforced, in order to promote the 
preservation of the world’s archaeological heritage. 
  
 
Greek-relic-looted-from-Libya-to-be-returned.html [https://perma.cc/P6FU-PQSA].  As 
in the case of forfeitures in the United States, the forfeited property becomes owned by the 
Crown and then, in the case of the ancient sculpture and the cuneiform tablets, returned to 
the rightful owners, in these cases Libya and Iraq respectively. 
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